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Timbers of Inwood Forest,
the Economics of Rent, and
the Evolving Dynamics of
Chapter 11
Edward R. Morrison†
I.

Introduction
In January 1988, the Supreme Court held that one of the Bankruptcy Code’s most important safeguards for secured creditors—‘‘adequate
protection’’ of the creditor’s interest in debtor property—does not include compensation for the delay caused by a bankruptcy proceeding.
Adequate protection does include compensation for wear, tear, and other
physical depreciation caused by the debtor’s use of collateral, but it
doesn’t compensate the creditor for investment opportunities that were
lost when the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition and prevented the
creditor from foreclosing, selling the collateral, and investing the proceeds. The secured creditor may be able to capitalize on these investment
opportunities at some point in the future—when the collateral is abandoned or payments are made under a plan of reorganization—but it
receives no compensation in the interim. So held the Court in United
Savings Bank Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.1
Timbers is a landmark in United States bankruptcy law. Before the
Court rendered its decision, the case attracted amicus briefs from the
nation’s leading practitioners and professors. Since then, the case has
occupied a prominent place in nearly every bankruptcy textbook and is
routinely cited for the important proposition that a debtor is not required to compensate undersecured2 creditors for the delay caused by a
lengthy, protracted bankruptcy proceeding.
† Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I am grateful to Douglas Baird,
Robert Ferguson, Christopher Mayer, and Alex Raskolnikov for helpful comments and
conversations and to Ariana Cooper and David Forsh for research assistance.
1.

484 U.S. 365 (1988).

2. A creditor is ‘‘undersecured’’ if the value of its claim is greater than the value of
its security interest in debtor property (collateral). Conversely, a creditor is ‘‘oversecured’’
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There is more to the story than this simple statement of black-letter
law. If we look beyond the United States Reports and study the docket in
the bankruptcy court and the statistics collected by the federal government, a very different account of Timbers emerges. Instead of a story
about undersecured creditors, lost investment opportunities, and delay,
Timbers is a story about the economics of rent, opt-out behavior, and
speed.
Timbers arose from a fight between a bank and a real estate venture
with a single asset, a Houston apartment complex, in which the bank
held a security interest. As Section II below explains, the venture had
filed a Chapter 11 petition; it had run out of cash and its debt to the
bank exceeded the value of the complex. Two things happened within the
first few weeks of the case. First, the venture agreed to turn over to the
bank all rents (net of expenses) generated by the apartment complex.
Next, the bank petitioned the court to lift the automatic stay unless the
debtor made monthly ‘‘adequate protection’’ payments equal to the
bank’s lost investment opportunities, i.e., the opportunities it could have
exploited had it been able to foreclose on the apartment complex, sell it,
and invest the proceeds. The Texas bankruptcy court granted the bank’s
request, ordering the venture to make monthly payments five times
larger than the rents currently being turned over to the bank. This is the
order that was ultimately reviewed, and reversed, by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court.
This simple sketch of the bankruptcy court proceedings present a
story of Timbers that is very different from the one commonly told.
When the bank petitioned the court for adequate protection, it was
hoping for more than just compensation for lost investment opportunities. The simple economics of rent, discussed in Section III, tells us that
the bank was already receiving most of this compensation via the
monthly rentals. When it petitioned the court for adequate protection
payments that were 400% larger than the monthly rentals, the bank was
probably betting on judicial error. If the court overvalued the monthly
adequate protection payments—as it probably did—the bank could be
certain that the case would end quickly. The debtor would be unable to
make the payments. This would create ‘‘cause’’ for lifting the stay and
allowing the bank to foreclose on the apartment complex. The bank’s
motion for adequate protection, then, was probably a gambit to terminate the bankruptcy process.
if the value of the collateral exceeds the creditor’s claim; the excess is often called an
‘‘equity cushion.’’ Thanks to 11 U.S.C. §506(b), oversecured creditors are entitled to
periodic payments of interest at the rate specified in the underlying loan agreement. These
payments are subtracted from the ‘‘equity cushion;’’ when the cushion is depleted, the
payments end.
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The bank wanted out, but it’s easy to understand why. This was, as
Section IV explains, a two-party dispute and the debtor had used federal
bankruptcy law merely to delay foreclosure. There were, to be sure, a
few other unsecured creditors (most of the unsecured debt was held by
owners of the real estate venture), but the bank was willing to pay these
creditors in full just to end the bankruptcy case. Nonetheless, the case
dragged on. The owners, it seems, were gambling on resurrection: if they
could delay the case long enough, property values might—just might—
increase enough to render the venture solvent again. That was a pipedream and the bank was unwilling to subsidize the owners’ gamble.
Moreover, bankruptcy is expensive; lawyers, accountants, and financial
advisors must be hired to run the process. Even if it would take as long
to sell the property outside bankruptcy as it would to reorganize it inside
a Chapter 11—and even if an out-of-bankruptcy sale would yield the
same return to the bank as reorganization—the bank might still want to
opt out of the bankruptcy process merely to avoid its administrative
costs.
By the time it reached the Supreme Court, then, Timbers had
morphed into something altogether different. It was no longer a complicated story about a bank’s effort to opt out of the Code. It had become an
abstract debate about the scope of the term ‘‘adequate protection.’’ And,
as we will see in Section V, the Court’s conclusion—denying compensation for lost investment opportunities—rests on shaky statutory analysis
and has come under attack from many commentators. But if we view the
case against its factual background, the Court’s conclusion may make
some sense. It effectively blocked the bank’s effort to opt out of the
bankruptcy process; many other provisions of the Code attempt to do
precisely the same thing.3
Sensible or not, the Court’s decision has had limited vitality, as
Section VI explains. The decision has been overruled, in part, by Congress. Moreover, a rule denying compensation for lost investment opportunities is important only when bankruptcy cases are lengthy affairs.
But case duration has fallen dramatically—by nearly 60% among cases
involving large, publicly-traded corporations—since the Court handed
down Timbers. Indeed, the Court may have contributed to the decline by
uttering its famous dictum that a bankruptcy court should lift the
automatic stay unless there is a ‘‘reasonable possibility of a successful
reorganization within a reasonable time.’’4
Timbers, then, is a complicated story, with lessons on the economics
of rent, opt-out behavior, and case speed. These lessons can’t be drawn
3. See, e.g., the Codes various rules prohibiting ‘‘ipso facto’’ clauses. 11 U.S.C.
§§365(b)(2), 365(e)(1), 541(c)(1), 545.
4.

484 U.S. at 376 supra note 1.
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from the Supreme Court’s opinion. They can, I hope, be drawn from the
Sections that follow.
II.

The debtor: oil shocks and a gated community
Built in 1981, Timbers of Inwood Forest was (and still is) a gated
community bordering Houston’s Inwood Forest Golf Club. Sitting on
approximately 6 acres, the community was home to fourteen one or twostory buildings with 190 or so rentable units,5 ranging from 607 to 1,012
square feet.6 Featuring enclosed patios and a community swimming pool,
the apartments were (and still are) modest but comfortable homes.7 In
May of 1982, the complex was reported to be worth $6.25 million.8
Legally, Timbers of Inwood Forest was structured as a limited
partnership with two general partners—Woody Mann, Jr., and Dorado
Corp.—and about 30 limited partners.9 Funds to build the complex came
from a $4.1 million non-recourse10 loan from United Savings Association
of Texas, a local savings and loan (‘‘S & L’’). The loan was secured by
the apartment complex, its rental income, and a $1.3 million personal
guarantees from the general partners.11 The complex was actually only
5. The case records offer conflicting reports on the number of units. Schedule B,
Statement of All Property of Debtor (Mar. 21, 1985) [Docket 13], reports 192, but debtor’s
Hr’g Mem., at 1 (May 6, 1985) [Docket 29] reports 188 (Bracketed references to [Docket X]
indicate the docket number for the cited source in the bankruptcy court proceedings.)
6. Schedule B, Statement of All Property of Debtor (March 21, 1985) [Docket 13].
7. When Timbers entered bankruptcy in 1985, the average monthly rent per unit was
about $216, worth about $409 in current (2006) dollars. Today, according to various
websites, the average monthly rental ranges from $435 to $600. In real (inflation-adjusted)
terms, then, the rentals have not risen much over the past 20 years. The apartment
complex remains a moderately-priced dwelling.
I computed the monthly rental in 1985 as follows: the debtor’s monthly operating
reports showed monthly rental revenue equal to about $39,000 at a time when the vacancy
rate was about 25%. (See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.) Assuming the complex
had 190 available units, the $39,000 in monthly revenue was generated by 181 apartments.
Dividing $39,000 by 181 yields a per-unit monthly rental of about $216, in 1985 dollars. I
converted that sum to current (2006) dollars using Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI
Inflation Calculator (visited Sept. 1, 2006) ¢http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl$.
Data on current rentals was drawn from the following websites: moveforfree.com
(visited Sept. 29, 2006) ¢http://www.moveforfree.com/apartments/Texas/Houston/Timbers,
of,Inwood,Forest,I,and,II.html$; Rent.com (visited Sept. 1, 2006) ¢http://www.rent.com/
rentals/texas/houston-and-vicinity/houston/north-houston/$.
8. Hr’g Mem., at 1 (May 6, 1985) [Docket 29].
9. Statement of Financial Affairs, Item 21 (Mar. 21, 1985) [Docket 12].
10. The loan is described as a ‘‘ ‘non-liability’ note, pursuant to the provision of
which United Savings may not seek a judgment against the Debtor for liability under the
Note, but may only pursue its security therefore.’’ Mot. for Relief from Stay of an Act
Against Property, at 4 (Mar. 18, 1985) [Docket 7].
11. Emergency Mot. for Authority to Use Cash Collateral and Mot. for Expedited
Hr’g, at 2 (Mar. 7, 1985) [Docket 5]; Tr. of Recorded Proceedings 31 (Apr. 17, 1985)
[Docket 51].
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‘‘Phase I’’ of a broader development plan. Mann and Dorado Corp. were
also general partners of another entity, ‘‘Timbers of Inwood Forest
Apartments, Phase II.’’12
What otherwise seemed an attractive residential development became a nightmare in the mid 1980s. The price of oil collapsed and
Houston’s oil-based economy fell with it.13 Between 1981 and 1985, crude
oil prices fell 40%; they fell another 50% in the first half of 1986 alone.14
A gallon of crude cost $38 in 1981; it cost only $11.82 in July 1986.15 As
the price of oil plummeted, a large fraction of Houston’s workers lost
jobs: between 1982 and 1987, one out of every eight workers was
suddenly unemployed.16 Real estate prices were hit particularly hard.
After years of overbuilding (spurred by overzealous and ultimately
illiquid S & Ls), Houston found itself in 1986 with 200,000 vacant
homes, twice as many vacancies as was typical for a city of its size.17
These vacancies, combined with the local recession, produced a dramatic
collapse in real estate prices. Between 1983 and 1988, the average home
price fell about 25%, from about $106,000 to about $80,000.18 Apartment
rentals suffered more dramatic declines, falling in some areas by 67%
relative to their 1982 levels.19
12. Aff. of Woody Mann, Jr., Individually and Dorado Corporation, A Texas Corporation, at 2 (Apr. 30, 1986) [Docket 94].
13. See, e.g., Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Federal Government As A Useful Enemy:
Perspectives On The Bush Energy/Environmental Agenda From The Texas Oilfields, 19
Pace Environ. L. Rev. 1, 20–21 (2001) (‘‘Increasing supplies hit reduced demand, and oil
and gas prices dropped precipitously starting in 1981, only eight short years after the
embargo. Houston’s economy tumbled; its real estate markets cratered.’’ (footnote omitted)).
14. Dermot Gately, Lessons From the 1986 Oil Price Collapse, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 237, 238 (1986).
15. Stephen P.A. Brown and Mine K. Yücel, The Effect of High Oil Prices on Today’s
Texas Economy, SOUTHWEST ECONOMY, Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 1, 2 (visited Sept. 1, 2006) ¢http://
www.dallasfed.org/research/swe/2004/swe0405a.html$.
16. Bill Gilmer, High Oil Prices Boost Houston’s Job Growth, Improve Local Outlook,
HOUSTON BUSINESS, Dec. 2000 (visited Sept. 1, 2006) ¢http://www.dallasfed.org/research/
houston/2000/hb0008.html$.
17. Robert W. Gilmer and Iram Siddik, 1982–90: When Times Were Bad in Houston,
HOUSTON BUSINESS, June 2003, at 1, 4 (visited Sept. 1, 2006) ¢http://dallasfed.org/research/
houston/2003/hb0304.html$.
18. Figures derived from data published by the Real Estate Center at Texas A & M
University, available at ¢http://recenter.tamu.edu/data/hs/hs280a.htm$ (visited Sept. 1,
2006). See also Leslie Haggin Geary, Real Estate Horror Stories, CNN MONEY, Dec. 2, 2002
(visited Sept. 1, 2006) ¢http://money.cnn.com/2002/12/02/pf/yourhome/q housingbusts/$
(‘‘In just three years, from 1985 to 1988, the typical home price [in Houston] dropped by 21
percent—or from $78,600 to $61,800.’’).
19. Fred A. Little, Distress Situations: Limited Partner Defaults, Insolvency, Vulture
Funds, Resales, and Offerings, C282 ALI–ABA 377, 415 (Mar. 17, 1988) (‘‘[O]verbuilding
and a badly depressed oil economy in Houston caused that apartment market in 1985 to
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By 1984, Timbers was one of the casualties of Houston’s recession.
Property that was once worth $6.25 million was now worth at most
$4.25 million.20 The vacancy rate had soared to about 50% and Timbers
could no longer service its debt.21 Its monthly payments amounted to
about $46,000,22 but rentals barely exceeded $10,000, even before subtracting maintenance costs and taxes. Hoping to bridge the gap, Dorado
Corp. made periodic loans to Timbers; by July 1984, these loans totaled
$467,000.23 With no additional liquidity, Timbers suspended payments to
the bank during the latter half of 1984; by February of 1985, it was eight
months behind and United Savings24 had commenced foreclosure proceedings in state court.25 The bank had also brought suit against Dorado
Corp., Woody Mann, and other guarantors.26
Timbers held onto its property by agreeing to an order, entered in
state court, which postponed United’s foreclosure proceedings for one
month, until March 1985.27 In exchange, United was given authority to
take control of the property and collect February’s rentals. This was, in
hindsight, meager compensation. The agreed order gave Timbers just
enough time to file a petition, on March 4, 1985, under Chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code.
suffer a drop in effective rental rates, including concessions, of up to two thirds since the
peak in 1982. In other words, an apartment which rented for $600 in 1982 currently could
rent, with concessions, for about $200 per month.’’).
20.

Hr’g Mem. at 1–2 (May 6, 1985) [Docket 29].

21.

Tr. of Recorded Proceedings at 59 (Apr. 17, 1985) [Docket 51].

22. Mot. for Stay Pending Appeal without Bond, Exhibit ‘‘B’’ (Aff. of Woody Mann,
Jr., Individually and Dorado Corporation, A Texas Corporation), filed in United Savings
Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., No. H–85–4529 (S.D. Tex. Aug.
15, 1985).
23.

Id.

24. United too was in trouble, but its troubles were not driven entirely by the local
recession. United was a thrift institution, commonly known as an S & L. Like many other
S & L’s during that period, it would soon be insolvent, to the tune of $1.6 billion by 1988.
The government bailout of United would be the fifth largest S & L rescue. See Christopher
Helman, Timber!, FORBES, Dec. 12, 2005, at 102.
25.

Mot. for Relief from Stay of an Act Against Property at 3 (Mar. 18, 1985) [Docket

7].
26. Mot. for Stay Pending Appeal without Bond, Exhibit ‘‘B’’ (Aff. of Woody Mann,
Jr., Individually and Dorado Corporation, A Texas Corporation), filed in United Savings
Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., No. H–85–4529 (S.D. Tex. Aug.
15, 1985).
27.
7].

Mot. for Relief from Stay of an Act Against Property at 3 (Mar. 18, 1985) [Docket
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III.

The creditor: adequate protection and the economics of
rent
The first fifteen days of the case brought two motions—Timber’s
motion to use cash collateral28 and United’s motion for relief from the
automatic stay29—that dominated the entire case. United’s motion is
well-known because it garnered the attention of the Supreme Court, as
we will see. Timber’s motion has gone largely unnoticed, yet it is—as I
will argue here—central to understanding the dynamics of the case and
the implications of the Court’s decision.
The two motions were filed nearly simultaneously—Timbers’ on
March 7 and United’s on March 18. The bankruptcy court turned first to
the ‘‘emergency’’ motion for authority to use cash collateral. Because of
United’s security interest in rents generated by the apartment complex,
Timbers needed permission—either United’s or the court’s—to use any
rental income to fund ongoing operations, including payroll.30 United
offered its consent, but it did so under stringent conditions. Timbers
could use the monthly rentals for only one purpose: to pay approved
expenses outlined in a monthly budget.31 Any leftover rentals would be
remitted to United as a form of adequate protection.32 Timbers would, in
other words, be put on a diet: it could spend no more than $4,350 on
monthly payroll, $1,750 on maintenance, and $6,250 on utilities.33 Even
28. Emergency Mot. for Authority to Use Cash Collateral and Mot. for Expedited
Hr’g (Mar. 7, 1985) [Docket 5].
29. Mot. for Relief from Stay of an Act Against Property (Mar. 18, 1985) [Docket 7].
30. 11 U.S.C. 363(c)(2).
31. Agreed Order Regarding the Debtor’s Use of Cash Collateral, at 2 (Mar. 25, 1985)
[Docket 16].
32. Id. at 3. The order characterized the payments to United as ‘‘adequate protection’’ of its interest in the cash collateral, not as payments that would be deducted from the
bank’s overall claim. Carlson hypothesizes that the payments to United might have been
deducted from the bank’s claim, but I find no evidence of this. See David Gray Carlson,
Adequate Protection Payments and the Surrender of Cash Collateral in Chapter 11 Reorganization, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1357, 1371 (1994). Indeed, the bank’s lift-stay motions suggest
that it did not think the cash-collateral adequate protection payments reduced the value of
its claim. In March 1985, United’s first lift-stay motion valued its claim at approximately
$4.2 million. Mot. for Relief from Stay of an Act Against Property, at 2 (Mar. 19, 1985)
[Docket 7]. In January 1988, United filed another lift-stay motion, after the Supreme Court
held that it was not entitled to compensation for lost investment opportunities. Although
Timbers had transferred net rentals to the bank for nearly three years, United’s lift-stay
motion valued its claim at precisely the same amount—$4.2 million.
In any event, it matters little whether the monthly cash collateral payments reduced
United’s claim or not. In either case, it was receiving every cent that the property
generated (net of expenses). These payments compensated United for the delay caused by
the bankruptcy proceeding, which prevented it from foreclosing on the property, selling it,
and investing the proceeds.
33. Agreed Order Regarding the Debtor’s Use of Cash Collateral, Appendix (‘‘Schedule of Estimated Monthly Operating Expenses’’) (Mar. 25, 1985) [Docket 16].
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if an expenditure fell below the budgeted amount, United could still
challenge its necessity.34 Timbers agreed and the court issued an agreed
order, effectively handing control over Timbers’ operations to United.
This form of creditor control is commonly observed in Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) Financing Agreements today.35
The cash collateral order, then, gave United the benefits of ownership. Everyone agreed that the apartment complex was in excellent
shape and under good management.36 It was now under a budget as well,
and monthly rentals were being swept into United’s account. It seems
likely that the bank could have done no better if it ran the complex
itself.37
This is an important point. The cash collateral order gave United
the right to all rental income generated by the apartment complex, net of
approved expenditures. Assuming they were set properly—and we have
no reason to suppose otherwise—the rents should have ensured that
Timbers’ owners earned as much from the apartment complex as they
would have earned from alternative investments with comparable risk.
Put differently, the owners should have charged monthly rentals that
were high enough to compensate the owners for the ‘‘opportunity cost’’
of renting. Instead of renting out the individual units, they could sell the
property and invest the proceeds. The return on such an investment is
the opportunity cost of renting.
If we formalize this intuition, we can better understand what United
was promised under the cash collateral order and what else it hoped to
gain in the lift-stay motion. Begin, then, with the simple observation
that no rational investor would invest in Timbers and rent the apartments unless the financial return from renting were at least as high as
the return on alternative investments with comparable risk. The monthly return from renting obviously includes the rentals paid by tenants, R.
But this is just the direct return from renting. Like any other investment, real estate appreciates (or declines) in value over time. Such
appreciation is called a ‘‘capital gain’’ and represents an indirect return
34. In addition to imposing a budget, the order gave United the right to challenge the
necessity of any particular expenditure. Id. at 3.
35. See Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209 (2006).
36. See, e.g., Hr’g Mem. at 2 (May 6, 1985) [Docket 29] (‘‘Both appraisers [for debtor
and United Savings] indicated that the condition and the management of the property was
excellent.’’[sic]).
37. See, e.g., Reply to Resp. to Appellant’s Mot. for Stay Pending Appeal without
Bond, Ex. A (‘‘Aff. of George Cornwell’’), at Item 8 [Docket 57] (‘‘[If it forecloses], United
will receive only the excess cash generated by the Timbers’ Property over and above the
necessary operating expenses for maintaining the Timbers’ Property, which is exactly what
it is presently receiving under the Agreed Cash Collateral Order.’’).
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from renting: at some point in the future, the investor will sell the
property and receive the capital gains. We can write this capital gain as
G = Pg, where P is the current market price of the real estate and g the
expected growth per period (here, for convenience, we will focus on
monthly periods).
Thus, the monthly return from renting includes rentals, R, and
expected capital gains, Pg. Renting, however, has costs. One is the wear
and tear, or ‘‘depreciation,’’ caused by tenants’ use of the units. We can
represent this as D=Pd, where d is the rate of depreciation per month.
Another cost is property taxes (T=Pt), assessed by local governments.38
If we subtract these costs from the returns from renting, we have the
following monthly net return from renting: RvG-D-T=RvP(g-d-t).
This net return from renting should be at least as large as the
return from alternative investments. If the apartment complex (worth P)
were sold and the proceeds invested, they would yield a monthly return
equal to Q=Pr. Here, r is the ‘‘rate of return’’; it compensates the
investor for the time value of money (a dollar today is worth more than a
dollar tomorrow) and risk (riskier investments attract investors by
paying higher rates of return). We can, then, decompose r into two
components: the rate of return on risk-free assets (i) and a risk-premium
(b). The risk-free rate is the rate available on assets, such as bonds
issued by the federal government (so-called ‘‘T bills’’), with a nearcertain return. There is virtually no risk that the government will not
honor its promise to pay interest (i) on its short-term bonds. There is
such a risk when bonds are issued by private actors, such as corporations, which may suffer distress and default on their obligations. To
induce investors to buy these risky bonds, private actors must offer to
pay an interest rate r that is higher than the risk-free rate. The
difference between r and i is called the risk premium: r-i=b.
With these definitions in hand, we can now say something concrete
about the rentals that Timbers probably charged. These rentals should
have been large enough to ensure that the monthly net return from
renting was greater than or equal to the monthly return on alternative
investments:
R v P(g–d–t) · P (i v b)
(1)
If capital markets function properly, this inequality should be an equality. If the net return on renting exceeds the return on alternative
investments, no one will invest in the alternatives. Investors will flock to
real estate, which offers a higher return. But as investors pour money
into real estate, the net returns will fall. Too much money will be
38. Technically, mortgage interest and property taxes are deductible, which reduces
the total tax bill. Because Timbers was losing money, however, income taxes were
irrelevant. In any event, I abstract from these issues and treat T as the net tax bill.
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chasing too few investments; expected capital gains (g) will decline. The
net return will decline until the return from renting equals the return
from alternative investments. In equilibrium, then, the inequality should
be an equality:
R v P(g–d–t) = P(i v b)

(2)

This can be rearranged as a simple expression for monthly rentals:39
R = P(i v b v t v d–g)

(3)

This is a helpful formula for several reasons. It makes clear why
Houston’s recession led to a dramatic reduction in rentals: as land prices
(P) fell, rentals (R) slid too. More importantly, the formula makes clear
that the court’s cash collateral order assured United of some compensation for lost investment opportunities.40 Recall that the court’s order
obligated Timbers to pay United all rents, R, after deducting maintenance costs and taxes, P(dvt).41 Thus, United expected monthly payments equal to p:
p = R–P(d v t) = P(i v b–g)

(4)

We see, then, that the cash collateral order guaranteed compensation for
lost opportunities, P(ivb), net of expected capital gains, Pg.
IV.

The bankruptcy court decision: when is rent not enough

United didn’t think the cash collateral order was enough. It wanted
full compensation for lost investment opportunities, not compensation
discounted by expected capital gains. This brings us to the bank’s motion
for relief from the automatic stay.
A.

Adequate protection and foregone opportunities

Timbers’ Chapter 11 filing, United argued, was a bald effort to
‘‘speculate on real property at the expense’’ of the bank.42 There was no
39. For more detailed analysis of the relationship between asset prices and rents, see
Charles Himmelberg, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai, Assessing High House Prices:
Bubbles, Fundamentals and Misperceptions, 19 J. Econ. Perspectives 67 (Fall 2005); DENNIS
W. CARLTON AND JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 77–78 (2d ed. 1994).
40. This observation has been made by others, who have noted that a security
interest in the proceeds of collateral, such as rents, can serve as a substitute for interest
payments on the value of the collateral. See, e.g., In re Timbers of Inwood Forest, 808 F.2d
363, 379 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Jones, J., dissenting) (‘‘Rent is the quintessential
measure of the time-value of real property.’’); Brief for Thomas H. Jackson as Amicus
Curiae 17, United Savings Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S.
365 (1988) (No. 86–1602) (‘‘[W]hen Congress provides fair market rent to a party, Congress
is providing compensation for time value.’’); Carlson, supra note 32, at 1370–71.
41. The cash collateral order does not mention taxes; I assume that Timbers would
deduct property taxes from any rents turned over to United.
42.
7].

Mot. for Relief from Stay of an Act Against Property, at 4 (Mar. 18, 1985) [Docket
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business to save—only a piece of property to fight over.43 And there were
no other creditors who could benefit from the bankruptcy process. The
remaining creditors held unsecured debt, and most of this was held by
Timbers’ own general partners.44 United said it was willing to pay the
unsecured creditors in full, just to end the case, but the general partners,
it seems, were uninterested.45 They too hoped for more; they wanted a
return on their equity.
At the hearing on its lift-stay motion, United argued in the alternative for adequate protection. Although its own expert testified that the
property was in ‘‘excellent condition’’ and slightly appreciating in value
over time,46 United argued that it was still entitled to compensation,
namely compensation for the foregone return it would have earned, had
Timbers’ bankruptcy not prevented it from foreclosing on the property,
selling it, and investing the proceeds at a market rate of interest. This
was a somewhat novel argument at the time, but was compelled, United
believed, by the text of the Code and prior caselaw.
Section 361(1) of the United States Bankruptcy Code47 defines
‘‘adequate protection’’ as relief designed to compensate the secured
creditor for ‘‘a decrease in the value of [the creditor’s] interest in
[debtor] property.’’ The ‘‘value’’ of the creditor’s interest is the value
43. Interestingly, United’s motion had an alternative ground for lifting the automatic
stay: bad faith. Timbers’ filing, United argued, was a bad faith filing and this too provided
‘‘cause’’ for lifting the stay. See also Tr. of Recorded Proceedings at 2 (Apr. 17, 1985)
[Docket 51] (‘‘The issues I’d like to raise involve not just the failure to provide adequate
protection, but also my belief that on the law, this is not a good faith filing [under] the
Bankruptcy Code, and that we are entitled to relief [from the] Stay on that basis.’’).
Indeed, Timbers interpreted the motion this way. See Hr’g Mem. of Law at 2 (May 6, 1985)
(‘‘For purposes of this Memorandum, Timbers is assuming that United is attempting to
assert that cause exists [to lift the stay] because the bankruptcy petition was filed in bad
faith.’’).
This may seem like an odd argument, because bad-faith arguments are typically made
in motions to dismiss. But see In re Corp. Déjà Vu, 34 B.R. 845, 846–47 (Bankr. D. Md.
1983). United, it seems, hoped a court would decide a lift-stay motion more quickly than a
motion to dismiss. See Tr. at 32 [Docket 51] (‘‘Now, I might [say] why, as a practical
matter, we bring this up in the form of a 362 motion, and that is simply that with interest
accruing at fifty thousand dollars TTT a month TTT we’d like to get a hearing as quickly as
possible TTT A Motion to Dismiss would take us till who knows when.’’). The court,
however, concluded that issues relating to bad faith belonged in a motion to dismiss and
refused to rule on them in the context of United’s lift-stay motion. See Tr. at 40 [Docket
51].
44.

Tr. at 33–34 [Docket 51].

45.

Id.

46. Id. at 58 (United’s expert testified that the ‘‘present management, as far as
running the apartments and leasing out, I would characterize as excellent.’’).
47. 11 U.S.C. §361(1). Unless noted otherwise, statutes mentioned in the main text
are provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
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that the creditor could obtain from a foreclosure sale, which includes—
United argued—both the proceeds from the sale and the return from
investing those proceeds. Indeed, §361(3) appears to support United’s
view. It states ‘‘adequate protection’’ includes any relief that ‘‘will result
in the realization by [the creditor] of the indubitable equivalent of [the
creditor’s] interest in [the debtor’s] property.’’ The phrase ‘‘indubitable
equivalent’’ is a term of art, derived from Judge Learned Hand’s preCode opinion, In re Murel Holding Corp.:
It is plain that ‘adequate protection’ must be completely compensatory; and that payment ten years hence is not generally the equivalent of payment now. Interest is indeed the common measure of the
difference, but a creditor who fears the safety of his principal will
scarcely be content with that; he wishes to get his money or at least
the property. We see no reason to suppose that the [Bankruptcy Act]
was intended to deprive him of that in the interest of junior holders,
unless by a substitute of the most indubitable equivalence.48
Although Murel is a pre-Code case, the same logic was applied to a postCode case, In re American Mariner Industries,49 by the Ninth Circuit,
which held that ‘‘adequate protection’’ under §361 includes compensation for lost investment opportunities.
These ‘‘lost opportunities,’’ United argued, are economically indistinguishable from the costs of physical depreciation. When a bankruptcy
filing prevents a bank from foreclosing, it prevents the bank from
avoiding depreciation of the property in the hands of the debtor. The
longer the case, the greater the depreciation and the larger the loss
suffered by the bank: as its collateral falls in value, its expected payout
at the end of the case dwindles. We can say exactly the same about
foregone interest, United argued: when a bankruptcy filing prevents a
bank from foreclosing, it also prevents the bank from selling the property, investing the proceeds, and receiving a market rate of interest. The
longer the case, the greater the foregone interest and the larger the loss
suffered by the bank. There was—and still is—no doubt that a creditor
should be protected against physical depreciation of collateral. There is
no reason, United argued, for treating foregone interest differently.50
United’s argument found support in work by law and economic
scholars, most notably Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson.51 The pri48.

75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935).

49.

734 F.2d 426, 432–35 (9th Cir. 1984).

50. Tr. at 37 [Docket 51] (arguing that ‘‘an undersecured lien Creditor is entitled to
the indubitable equivalent [of its interest in the debtor’s property], and that equivalent
means TTT that if he’s postponed from foreclosing, he will at least get, during the interim,
the interest on his debt’’).
51. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations
and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of
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mary goal of a Chapter 11 case, they noted, is to avoid premature
liquidation and thereby increase the return to unsecured creditors and
equityholders. These parties can benefit from the bankruptcy process.
But secured creditors have little to gain. Their returns are capped by the
value of the collateral: if the firm is liquidated immediately, they will
receive the value of the collateral; if it is reorganized several years from
now, they will still receive no more than the value of the collateral. They
have little to gain, and much to lose, from the delay caused by a
bankruptcy case. Consistent with this view, many provisions of the Code
allocate the cost of delay to unsecured creditors and equityholders. Their
claims, for example, are paid after administrative expenses, including
attorney fees.52
Adequate protection can be seen in the same light, as a mechanism
for achieving an efficient allocation of risk:53 the downside risks inherent
Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 97, 127–29 (1984). See also Br. for
Thomas H. Jackson as Amicus Curiae 3–15, 25, United Savings Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers
of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (No. 86–1602) (‘‘Secured creditors are not
the beneficiaries of a bankruptcy proceeding; they should not be asked to bear its costs.’’).
52. 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(9).
53. The efficiency of this risk allocation has been questioned by some scholars, who
argue that secured creditors may be willing to share the risks of ‘‘common disasters’’ with
unsecured creditors and equityholders. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott and Thomas Jackson, On
the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, 75
Va. L. Rev. 155 (1989). Although risk-sharing forces secured creditors to bear some of the
costs of bankruptcy, it also reduces the incentives of insiders to engage in overly-risky,
potentially wasteful behavior prior to the bankruptcy filing. If managers and equityholders
realize that the firm is insolvent and that they will receive nothing in bankruptcy, they
have strong incentives to gamble on the firm’s resurrection; they might, for example, invest
in high-risk, low-return projects. If the projects succeed, the firm recovers, managers keep
their jobs, and equityholders retain valuable shares in the firm. If the project fails, the firm
incurs a loss and enters bankruptcy, but the loss is borne entirely by creditors. Scott and
Jackson note that this incentive to ‘‘gamble on resurrection’’ is mitigated when equityholders and managers are assured of some payoff in bankruptcy. This payoff is put at risk by
gambles. One way to assure that these parties receive a payoff in bankruptcy, Scott and
Jackson note, is to force secured creditors to bear some of the costs of the bankruptcy
process. Indeed, if the costs of contracting were low, secured creditors would agree ex ante
to share these costs, because doing so reduces managers’ incentive to take wasteful
gambles. Scott and Jackson hypothesize that contracting costs are high and that bankruptcy law may offer the kind of contract that the parties would have written had they been
able to. This argument, however, assumes that bankruptcy is an exogenous event, like a
hurricane. It seems more likely, as Barry Adler argues in Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation,
77 Cornell L. Rev. 439 (1992), that financial distress is endogenous. If so, risk-sharing has a
downside. Although it reduces managers’ incentive to take wasteful gambles when a firm is
insolvent, it also reduces the incentive to avoid insolvency in the first place. Equityholders
and managers realize that, in the event of insolvency, they will still receive a payoff. Risksharing, then, can generate a form of moral hazard: managers take fewer steps to avoid
bankruptcy. The costs and benefits of risk-sharing are still the subject of debate. See, e.g.,
Kenneth M. Ayotte, Bankruptcy and Entrepreneurship: The Value of a Fresh Start, J. L.,
Econ. & Org. (forthcoming 2007); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Ex Ante Costs of Violating
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in a lengthy bankruptcy case (depreciation of collateral, failure of the
business) should be borne by the parties who will enjoy any upside
(recovery of the business) namely, unsecured creditors and equityholders. One of the costs of the bankruptcy process is the secured creditor’s
foregone opportunity to force a foreclosure sale of the collateral and
invest the proceeds. This is a right the creditor enjoys under state law. It
is sensible to suspend it only if unsecured creditors and equity holders
compensate other ‘‘adequate protection’’ to—the secured creditor. Without having to pay compensation, these parties will be too willing to
attempt a reorganization, because they can foist some of the costs of
delay on others.54 And if secured creditors can anticipate these reorganization costs, they will take steps to protect themselves by, for example,
limiting the supply of credit—offering smaller loans at higher interest
rates—to potential borrowers. Future businesses may find it hard, perhaps impossible, to obtain loans.
Together, these arguments—grounded in the Code, caselaw, and
economic logic—persuaded the bankruptcy court in Timbers. It granted
United’s motion for adequate protection.55 The court found American
Mariner particularly persuasive: the decision was ‘‘clearly correct’’ and
‘‘achieved[d] a rational financial result.’’ Accordingly, the bankruptcy
court ordered Timbers to make monthly adequate protection payments
equal to $42,500 beginning six months after the date of filing (September
1985).56 The court assumed that, after foreclosure, the bank would take
six months to sell the property, at which time it would receive $4.25
million.57 Invested at a 12% interest rate, this sum would yield a monthly
return of $42,500. Interestingly, the Court opined that these adequate
payments should be in addition to the net rentals that Timbers had been
paying to United pursuant to the cash collateral order.58 The Court
didn’t have to reach that issue, though, because United agreed that
Timbers could use the rentals to fund the monthly $42,500 payments.59
This order, Timbers believed, was a death sentence; there was no
way it could make monthly payments in excess of $40,000. Recall that
the cash collateral order put the debtor on a budget: monthly operating
expenditures could not exceed $23,000. With property taxes running
Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy, 57 J. Fin. 445 (2002); Paul Povel, Optimal Soft and Tough
Bankruptcy Procedures, 15 J. L., Econ. & Org. 659 (1999).
54.

See, e.g., Baird and Jackson, supra note 51, at 121–25.

55. Order (April 24, 1985) [Docket 36]; Mem. Op. (May 20, 1985) [Docket 40], 49 B.R.
454 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985).
56.

49 B.R. at 461.

57.

Id. at 458–59, 461.

58.

Tr. at 111–22; 49 B.R. at 460.

59.

Tr. at 109–10.
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about $8,000 per month, total monthly expenditures were expected to
run around $31,000. Thus, to pay $42,500 per month in adequate
protection, the apartment complex would need to generate monthly
rentals of at least $73,500. But a quick look at Timbers’ operating
reports shows monthly rents averaging about $39,000 prior to the
court’s order. After deducting maintenance costs, this left net rentals of
only $8,000, far less than the $42,500 necessary to comply with the
court’s adequate protection order.60 To be sure, net rentals in early 1985
reflected a vacancy rate around 25%. Everyone expected vacancy rates to
fall in the near term, to about 5%.61 United’s expert testified that, with
5% vacancy, the apartment complex would generate approximately
$705,000 in rents annually, or $58,750 per month.62 Subtracting expenses of around $31,000 yields monthly net rentals of about $28,000,
still far less than the adequate protection payments ($42,500) ordered by
the court.
The court’s order, then, was a death sentence because Timbers was
destined to violate it, and a violation would constitute cause for lifting
the automatic stay and allowing the bank to foreclose on the apartment
complex. This reality didn’t escape the court’s attention:
‘‘Counsel for one of the Debtors [argues] that [today’s decision]
reduces (and potentially eliminates) the Debtor’s ability to reorganize. That [argument] is well foundedTTTT The result is inescapable,
however, since that is the only way TTT to protect the creditor’s
statutory and potential constitutional rights in the collateral. The
result is not as unfair as counsel suggests, however. If the Debtors
cannot even fund the present value of foreclosure rights in the
collateral, they have little equitable [claim] [sic] to a right to
reorganize.’’63
During a period when scholars regularly accused bankruptcy judges of
being ‘‘pro-debtor,’’64 this statement is a remarkable counter-example.
B.

Judicial error and strategic gamesmanship

Notice something odd in the foregoing account: United’s argument—
and the court’s order—assumes that the bank was not already receiving
compensation for lost opportunities. But that was clearly not the case. As
equation (4) made clear, the cash collateral order already obligated
60.

Rents averaged only $36,000 during the entire case.

61.

Tr. at 50.

62

Id.

63.

49 B.R. at 459 (footnote omitted).

64. See, e.g., Baird and Jackson, supra note 51, at 126–27; Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (pt. 1),
57 Am. Bankr. L. J. 99 (1983).
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Timbers to make monthly payments that included compensation for lost
opportunities, P(ivb). To be sure, this compensation was reduced by
expected capital gains, Pg, but United never argued that it was receiving
too little compensation for lost opportunities. It argued that it wasn’t
receiving any. Then again, although the court didn’t require it, United
did permit Timbers to deduct monthly rents (p) from the adequate
protection payments ordered by the court. Perhaps United sensed that it
would be problematic (and invite judicial scrutiny) for it to demand
monthly rents in addition to adequate protection payments.
There is still something odd here. The court ordered adequate
protection payments equal to $42,500, but the (net) monthly rents
generated by the complex amounted to only $8,000 currently and
$28,000 at some point in the future. What explains the massive gap
between these two numbers? Equation (4) implies that the two numbers
should be close to each other, unless expected capital gains are large. To
see this, rewrite equation (4) as follows:
P(i v b)–p= Pg
(5)
Is it plausible that the difference between the court’s order and actual
rentals (the left-hand side of the equation) was driven by the parties’
expectation of large capital gains in the future (the right-hand side)? The
adequate protection order implies that, in the court’s view, P(i v
b)=$42,500. Court records indicate that p was either $8,000 or $28,000.
Plugging these numbers into the left-hand side of equation (5) leads to
the conclusion that expected monthly capital gains, Pg, ranged from
$14,500 (if p=$28,000) to $34,500 (if p=$8,000). If we also assume that
P was approximately equal to $4 million (midway between the parties’
estimates), then equation (5) tells us that the apartment complex was
expected to appreciate in value at a rate of .36% to .9% per month (g), or
4.4% to 11% per year. Are these rates of growth plausible? Hardly. From
the late 1980s to 2004, real housing prices in Houston actually declined
(at a rate of about 1.2% per year).65 Unless the market in 1985 was
extremely optimistic about future capital gains, it seems unlikely that
expected capital gains, Pg, can possibly explain the difference between
the court’s adequate protection order ($42,500 monthly) and the rents
actually generated by the complex ($8,000 to $28,000 monthly).
An alternative explanation is judicial error. The court may have
made a (big) mistake when it estimated P(ivb)=$42,500. This is plausible; judicial error in valuation appears to be significant and frequent.66
65.

See Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai, supra note 39, at 72.

66. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird and Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation
Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 Yale L.J. 1930 (2006) (showing that
observed deviations from absolute priority—senior creditors going unpaid even though
junior interests receive value—often reflect efforts by the parties to settle disputes over
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Here, the court assumed that the apartment complex was worth over $4
million. The most conservative estimate of P, an estimate of liquidation
value offered by Timbers’ expert, was $2.3 million, almost half of the
court’s valuation. If the court had adopted this conservative number, and
applied the same 12% interest rate, monthly adequate protection payments would have equaled $23,000. Although still far in excess of net
rentals at the time of the order ($8,000), this number is fairly close to
the net rentals expected in the future (about $28,000).
Judicial error and expected capital gains explain the dramatic difference between the court’s adequate protection order and the rents generated by the apartment complex.67 These factors also explain why United
was so vigorous in pursuing adequate protection in addition to the net
rentals it was promised under the cash collateral order.
Adequate protection payments would guarantee United the same
return—and perhaps an even larger return, if the judge erred in its
favor—that it would have received had it been able to sell the complex
and invest the proceeds. Net rentals offered something less—they offered
compensation for lost investment opportunities discounted by expected
capital gains (Pg). In theory, an owner charges lower rents as expected
growth rises because the opportunity cost from renting (versus selling)
falls when the property is expected to appreciate in value. But United
wasn’t the owner of this property. It had an interest in the property, but
so did the unsecured creditors and equityholders. If the property appreciated, United would receive a greater return on its $4.4 million claim,
which was secured by, but exceeded the value of, the apartment complex.
But if the value of the property rose above $4.4 million, United would
receive no benefit. Once the property was worth more than United’s
claim, the only beneficiaries would be the unsecured creditors and
equityholders (and most of the unsecured debt was held by equityholders). Thus, although United was entitled to net rentals from the apartment complex, these rents effectively charged United for future capital
gains (gV) that would benefit others. United’s motion for adequate
protection, then, might be seen as an effort to recover lost opportunities
that went undercompensated by the net rentals turned over by Timbers.
firm valuation); Kerry O’Rourke, Valuation Uncertainty in Chapter 11 Reorganizations,
2005 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 403 (presenting evidence on the prevalence of valuation
uncertainty and its sources).
67. In his amicus brief, Prof. Jackson acknowledged the possibility that the net
rentals paid to United, pursuant to the cash collateral order, may have been sufficient
compensation for lost opportunities. See Br. for Thomas H. Jackson as Amicus Curiae 15 n.
16, United Savings Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1988)
(No. 86–1602) (‘‘Even if the bankruptcy judge used the wrong standard in deciding that the
existing rentals did not necessarily provide adequate protection to United Savings, this
issue (inherently fact-specific), would not be affected by reversal and remand by this Court
on the issue before it.’’).
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This is the benign explanation for United’s lift-stay motion. We
know, of course, that it is highly incomplete. Expected capital gains
cannot possibly explain the massive difference between Timbers’ net
rentals and the adequate protection that United requested (and the
court ordered). An alternative, less benign, explanation is that United
was trying to opt out of the bankruptcy process. It sought a court order
that Timbers could not possibly fulfill. United’s motion asked for monthly adequate protections that far outstripped Timbers’ ability to pay. If
the court granted the motion and Timbers was unable to comply, United
could cite Timbers’ non-compliance as ‘‘cause’’ for lifting the automatic
stay under §362(d)(2). Seen this way, United’s motion was an aggressive
strategy for putting a quick end to the bankruptcy case. It was gambling
the court would make a mistake and overvalue the property. If it did, the
bank could short-circuit the bankruptcy process and avoid its attendant
administrative costs.
Indeed, United was probably hoping for more than just a judicial
mistake. It may have filed its lift-stay motion as a threat, to induce
Timbers’ owners to contribute additional capital to the estate. If the stay
were lifted and the bank allowed to foreclose and sell the apartment
complex, the tax consequences for the owners would have been significant. The difference between the sale price (perhaps as low as $2 million)
and the value of the bank’s nonrecourse claim (over $4 million) would
have constituted taxable income to the partners.68
As we will see, the automatic stay was lifted in 1988, after the
Supreme Court rendered its decision, and United foreclosed. Although
we have no record of the sale price then, we do have information about
subsequent sales during the mid–1990s. In September 1995, the complex
was sold to a buyer, who obtained a $1.5 million mortgage (about $1.16
million in 1988 dollars).69 It was sold again in October 1996 and the
buyer obtained a $2.8 million mortgage ($2.17 million in 1988 dollars).70
Based on these mortgages, it seems likely that, when United foreclosed
in the late 1980s, it sold the property for no more than $2 million and
may have sold for as little as $1 million. These figures offer strong
support for the conclusion that the court made a grave error in valuing
the property at $4.25 million and that United was either gambling on
judicial error or using the lift-stay motion as a threat to induce Timbers’
partners to commit additional funds to the business. The story of Inwood
Forest, then, is in large part a story of error and strategic gamesmanship.
68.

Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).

69. According to Harris County, Texas, Property Transfer Records, the buyer was V
A C Properties Co., which secured a $1.5 million loan from Klein Bank. See LexisNexis,
TXSALE database, Doc. Number R615228.
70. The buyer was TCP Inwood Central Partners LP, which secured a $2.8 million
loan from Riverway Bank. See id. at Doc. No. S195535.
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On appeal

Faced with a death sentence, Timbers appealed and the Fifth
Circuit, sitting in panel71 and en banc,72 reversed. Over a vigorous
dissent, the en banc panel rejected the approach taken by the Ninth
Circuit, as well as those adopted by the Fourth73 and Eighth Circuits,74
which had recently either sided with the Ninth or concluded that
compensation for foregone investment opportunities was permitted under special conditions, but not mandatory. The judges of the Fifth
Circuit admitted that §361 is ambiguous, but felt that pre-Code practice
and legislative history clarified matters.75 Prior to the 1978 Code, no
creditor was entitled to periodic interest payments, except the oversecured creditor.76 Neither the text of the 1978 Code nor its legislative
history suggest, the court argued, that Congress abandoned this rule
when it enacted the Code.77 To the contrary, the Fifth Circuit noted,
legislative history suggests that members of Congress expected undersecured creditors to be compensated for the misuse and depreciation of
collateral, but not for foregone investment opportunities.78
But this does not mean, the Fifth Circuit cautioned, that undersecured creditors are powerless and can be forced to endure lengthy
bankruptcy proceedings whenever their collateral is not depreciating
physically.79 A lift-stay motion under §362(d)(2)80 offers one avenue for
relief. A court should grant the motion if (A) ‘‘the debtor does not have
an equity in such property’’ and (B) ‘‘such property is not necessary to
an effective reorganization.’’ Condition (A) will be satisfied whenever the
motion is filed by an undersecured creditor, whose claim (by definition)
exceeds the value of the property in which it has a security interest.
71.

802 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1986).

72.

808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).

73.

Grundy Nat’l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985).

74.

In re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985).

75.
1986).

In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 793 F.2d 1380, 1389–1401 (5th Cir.

76.

Id. at 1386–87.

77.

Id. at 1387, 1393–1401.

78.

Id. at 1393–1401.

79. In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 808 F.2d 363, 370–73 (5th Cir.
1987) (en banc).
80. Section 362(d)(2) orders the court to lift the automatic stay with respect to
certain property, on request of a party in interest, if ‘‘the debtor does not have an equity in
such property’’ and ‘‘such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.’’ 11
U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).
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Condition (B) is harder to interpret. It is satisfied, the Fifth Circuit
stated, unless the debtor can show ‘‘that there is a reasonable possibility
of a successful reorganization within a reasonable time. The mere
indispensability of the property to the debtor’s survival and the debtor’s
hopes of reorganization are insufficient to justify continuation of the stay
when a reorganization is not reasonably possible.’’81 To be sure, the
debtor’s burden of proof will be less demanding early in a case, especially
during the exclusivity period. Nonetheless, ‘‘the debtor must do more
than evince high hopes; he must be able to show a reasonable prospect
for a successful reorganization within a reasonable time.’’82
This was a bold statement. At the time, the same standard for
granting a lift-stay motion—‘‘a reasonable possibility of a successful
reorganization’’—could be found in many bankruptcy court decisions,83
but no appellate court had previously addressed the issue. By embracing
this standard, the Fifth Circuit made clear that bankruptcy judges must
take seriously the debtor’s burden of showing that certain property is
‘‘necessary to an effective reorganization.’’
Judge Edith Jones dissented. A former bankruptcy lawyer,84 Judge
Jones found the en banc’s decision illogical. Section 361 protects the
secured creditor’s ‘‘interest in [the debtor’s] property.’’ The creditor has
no interest in the property itself (under state law, it does not have the
right to keep the property85 and, for regulatory reasons, banks often
avoid holding real estate86). The secured creditor’s ‘‘interest,’’ instead, is
the right to foreclose immediately after default, force a sale of the
property, and invest the proceeds. That, Judge Jones argued, is the only
logical interpretation of the phrase ‘‘interest in [the debtor’s] property’’
in 361.87
81.

808 F.2d at 370–71.

82.

Id. at 371.

83.

See cases listed in id. at 370–71 nn. 12–13.

84. Douglas K. Moll, Less is More: An Interview with Edith Hollan Jones, HOUSTON
LAWYER, Nov.-Dec. 2001.
85. Br. for Thomas Jackson as Amicus Curiae at 9, In re Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs., 808 F.2d 363 (1987) (No. 85–2678) (‘‘It follows that when a debtor files a petition
in bankruptcy, a secured creditor is not so much deprived of a particular piece of property
as it is deprived of the right to use that property to obtain a certain amount of money at a
certain time.’’).
86. Reply to Resp. to Appellant’s Mot. for Stay Pending Appeal without Bond, Ex. A
(Aff. of George Cornwell), at Item 7, In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., No. H–
85–4529 (D. S.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 1985) [Docket 57].
87. Timbers, 808 F.2d, at 376–77 (Jones, J., dissenting). The en banc decision, Judge
Jones believed, creates statutory anomalies. For one, the phrase ‘‘indubitable equivalent’’
means one thing in §361(3) and another in §1129(b)(2)(A), which governs cram-down of
secured claims. In the former, thanks to the en banc decision, it covers only physical
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The en banc’s decision would, she believed, merely give debtors
more room to delay bankruptcy cases, because they need not pay
undersecured creditors for delay. The court’s exhortation—that judges
should grant a lift-stay motion unless there is ‘‘a reasonable possibility
of a successful reorganization’’—is little more than empty words in a
world where a
hapless Chapter 11 effort may be kept aloft TTT for years, given
moderately astute debtor’s counsel, a court too busy or too docile to
terminate the case, and a steady cash flow. The debtor survives in
the meantime by consuming its assets, including any going-concern
surplus that may have originally existed in the company.88
VI.

In the Supreme Court

With a circuit split on its hands, the Supreme Court granted United
Savings’ petition for a writ of certiorari.89 The Court affirmed. With
Justice Scalia writing his first majority opinion in a bankruptcy case—
unanimous no less—the Court agreed with the first circuit that the
definition of ‘‘adequate protection’’ in §361(3) is ambiguous and might
include compensation for foregone interest. This ambiguity disappears,
the Court held, when §361 is read in tandem with at least four other
provisions of the Code.
The ambiguity in §361 derives, in part, from the phrase ‘‘interest in
such property.’’ Does this phrase refer to the secured creditor’s interest
in having the property ‘‘applied in payment of the debt upon completion
of the reorganization,’’90 in which case ‘‘adequate protection’’ only compensates for physical depreciation? Or does the phrase refer to the
creditor’s interest in foreclosing immediately, forcing a sale of the
property, and investing the proceeds, in which case ‘‘adequate protection’’ also compensates lost investment opportunities?
depreciation. In the latter, no one doubts that it covers depreciation as well as lost
opportunities. If a plan of reorganization is crammed down over a secured creditor’s
objection, the plan must offer that the creditor payments that compensate it for wear and
tear as well as delay. See also Collier on Bankruptcy 1129.05(2)(c) (15th ed. rev. 2006).
88.

Timbers, 808 F.2d at 383 (Jones, J., dissenting).

89. This was no minor dispute and attracted the attention of the nation’s leading
bankruptcy professors and practitioners. Three amicus briefs supported United’s position;
counsel of record on these included Thomas H. Jackson, Frank R. Kennedy, and Robert K.
Rasmussen (professors or soon-to-be professors). Another three amicus briefs were filed in
support of Timbers; counsel on these included Kenneth Klee and Raymond Nimmer
(professors or soon-to-be professors) as well as Martin Bienenstock, Richard Levin, Harvey
Miller, and Ron Trost (prominent or soon-to-be prominent attorneys).
90.
(1988).
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The same phrase, the Court noted, is used elsewhere in the Code,
including §506(a), which reads:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which
the estate has an interest TTT is a secured claim to the extent of the
value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such
property, TTT and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value
of such creditor’s interest TTT is less than the amount of such
allowed claim. [Emphasis added]
As used here, the Court said, the term ‘‘ ‘interest in property’ obviously
means [the secured creditor’s] security interest without taking account
of his right to immediate possession of the collateral.’’91 This was obvious
because a contrary reading would yield the odd result that a secured
creditor’s ‘‘allowed claim’’ would be in constant flux as it increased with
the accumulation of interest. In case this wasn’t obvious to the reader,
for good measure the Court cited legislative history supporting the
proposition that ‘‘value of such creditor’s interest’’ means ‘‘value of the
collateral.’’92
It is a bit surprising to find legislative history play a role in an
opinion authored by Justice Scalia. It is more surprising to see this kind
of statutory argument appear in the Court’s analysis, for it suffers a
basic weakness: Valuation of a secured creditor’s ‘‘interest’’ under
§506(a) is a different question from adequate protection of that ‘‘interest’’ under §361.93 A secured creditor’s interest in collateral is its right to
foreclose upon the property, force a sale, and invest the proceeds. The
present value of that right—the value that a court must determine under
§506(a)—is simply the current value of the collateral, as the Court notes.
If the creditor were able to foreclose immediately, it would obtain the
value of the collateral immediately, which it could reinvest. But if the
creditor is unable to foreclose immediately, and is forced to receive the
value of the collateral at some future date, the value of its ‘‘interest’’ in
the collateral depreciates. Only adequate protection under §361 can
prevent this depreciation. Thus, permitting payment of interest under
§361 is perfectly consistent with equating the creditor’s ‘‘interest’’ with
the value of the collateral under §506. The interest is valued under §506
and protected under §361.
The Court believed it found firmer ground in another provision of
§506. In subsection (b), Congress explicitly addressed the issue of postpetition interest and made it available only to oversecured creditors, who
‘‘shall be allowed TTT interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees,
costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under which such
claim arose.’’ By explicitly permitting postpetition interest payments to
91. Id. at 372.
92. Id.
93. A similar point is made by David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 43 Univ. Miami L. Rev. 577, 603 (1989).
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oversecured creditors, the Court reasoned, the Code must implicitly
prohibit such payments to undersecured creditors: ‘‘If the Code had
meant to give the undersecured creditor, who is thus denied interest on
his claim, interest on the value of his collateral, surely this is where that
disposition would have been set forth, and not obscured within the
‘adequate protection’ provision of §362(d)(1).’’94
This conclusion is less obvious than the Court lets on. All §506(b)
does is create a safe harbor for the oversecured creditor. Its contractual
right to periodic interest payments—at the contract interest rate—is
protected by §506(b).95 But the presence of a safe harbor for oversecured
creditors in one section does not imply the absence of any protection for
undersecured creditors in other sections. Indeed, §362(d)(1) provides
very different protection. Section 506(b) authorizes payment of interest
at the contract rate. Section 362(d)(1), in contrast, preserves the creditor’s ‘‘interest’’ in the collateral, which would presumably authorize
payment of interest at a market rate that may exceed the contract rate.
Indeed, interest payments under §506(b) may not protect an oversecured
creditor’s interest in collateral. To the extent that market rates exceed
contract rates, the creditor suffers from its inability to foreclose on the
property.
The Court found this argument ‘‘implausible,’’96 particularly because
it meant that an undersecured creditor could receive interest if it
petitioned for it under §362(d)(1) at the beginning of a case but would
not receive interest if it chose to ‘‘forebear and seek it only at the
completion of the reorganization.’’97 Why this is ‘‘incomprehensible’’ is
unclear. The same effect characterizes any petition for adequate protection: the secured creditor who seeks compensation for depreciation fares
better than the creditor who ‘‘forbears’’ and files no motion at all. In any
event, the Court believed a contrary conclusion would be inconsistent
with pre-Code bankruptcy law, which uniformly denied postpetition
interest to undersecured creditors. This was, the Court said, ‘‘part of the
conscious allocation of reorganization benefits and losses between un94.

Id. at 365.

95. This argument was pressed by Thomas Jackson, as amicus curia, and adopted by
the United States, as amicus in support of United, and by Judge Jones in her dissent. See
Br. for Thomas Jackson as Amicus Curiae at 26–29, United States Savings Ass’n v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (No. 86–1602); Br. for Thomas
Jackson as Amicus Curiae at 26–28, In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 808 F.2d 363
(1987) (No. 85–2678); Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
22–23, United States Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365
(1988) (No. 86–1602); Timbers, 808 F.2d at 380 (Jones, J., dissenting).
96. Timbers, 484 U.S. at 365. See also Br. for Raymond T. Nimmer as Amicus Curiae
5–6, United States Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1988)
(No. 86–1602).
97.

Id. at 374.
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dersecured and unsecured creditors.’’98 Here we see an appeal to the
‘‘share the hurt’’ policy that has been at the root of bankruptcy debates
for the past 25 years.99
The Court analyzed two more sections in order to shed light on the
meaning of ‘‘adequate protection.’’ One is §552, which generally prevents security interests from attaching to property acquired postpetiton.
The primary exception, contained in §552(b), permits attachment of a
prepetition security interest to postpetition ‘‘proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits’’ generated by the creditor’s collateral, provided
the security interest is perfected with respect to such property. The
Court thought it odd that, if undersecured creditors were to receive
interest under §362(d)(1), they would effectively receive ‘‘proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits’’ without needing a perfected security
interest in such property.100 Why this is odd is unclear. Section 552(b),
like §506(b), merely creates a safe harbor for certain types of creditors.
In §506(b) the safe harbor protects oversecured creditors; here it protects creditors with perfected interests in proceeds of collateral. Again,
the presence of a safe harbor for some secured creditors does not
logically imply the absence of any protection for all undersecured creditors. But what is most interesting about this argument is its recognition
that payment of proceeds (e.g., rents) under §552, is a rough substitute
for payment of interest under §361. As we have seen, this is precisely
what occurred here: United had a perfected interest in Timber’s monthly
rentals and received those rentals throughout the case.
Lastly, the court cited §362(d)(2), which offers an alternative ground
for lifting the automatic stay. Section 362(d)(1), at issue in this case,
allows a court to lift the stay ‘‘for cause, including the lack of adequate
protection of an interest in’’ collateral. In contrast, §362(d)(2) permits
lifting the stay when the debtor owns no equity in the property and the
property is ‘‘not necessary to an effective reorganization.’’ If ‘‘adequate
protection’’ includes compensation for lost investment opportunities, the
Court reasoned, an undersecured creditor can always obtain relief under
§362(d)(1): ‘‘cause’’ exists whenever compensation is not being paid.
This, in turn, makes ‘‘nonsense’’ of §362(d)(2). That section has no
utility, except in the odd case in which a creditor is receiving interest but
98.

Id. at 365.

99. In its original panel decision, for example, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the
‘‘rule that all creditors generally share some of the risk in a reorganization proceeding that
a successful reorganization will not be feasible.’’ Timbers, 793 F.2d 1380, 1382 (1986). For
different visions of ‘‘sharing the hurt,’’ see Robert E. Scott, Sharing the Risks of Bankruptcy: Timbers, Ahlers, and Beyond, 1989 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 183; Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775 (1987).
100.

Timbers, 484 U.S. at 374.
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wants to foreclose anyway.101 ‘‘Petitioner offers no reason why Congress
would want to provide relief for such an obstreperous and thoroughly
unharmed creditor.’’102
But is this such an odd case? Is a creditor ‘‘thoroughly unharmed’’ if
it is receiving adequate protection payments that include compensation
for lost investment opportunities? Hardly. The debtor can still impose a
variety of costs on the debtor. Property can be at risk even when it is not
depreciating. The debtor may, for example, have failed to purchase fire
insurance. More worrisome is the situation in which the debtor has
decided that it will sell or abandon collateral at some point in the future.
If the property is worth less than the secured creditor’s claim, the debtor
has no incentive to maintain it or maximize its value. The property
instead becomes a hostage in negotiations with the creditor. It is in cases
like these where §362(d)(2) is useful, regardless of whether the debtor is
paying adequate protection and regardless of whether adequate protection includes compensation for lost investment opportunities.103
The Court addressed several other arguments pressed by United
Savings and rebutted them with similar analysis. Most surprising is the
Court’s willingness to ignore the obvious tension between its interpretation of §362(d)(1) and the text of §726(a)(5), which orders interest paid
to unsecured creditors in the event the debtor is solvent at the case’s
end.104 Under the Court’s interpretation, oversecured creditors receive
interest payments under §506(b), unsecured creditors can receive interest under §726(a)(5), but undersecured creditors will never receive interest. This anomalous treatment—undersecured creditors given less protection than unsecured creditors—was acknowledged by the Court but
dismissed because ‘‘it will occur so rarely that it is more likely the
product of inadvertence than are the blatant inconsistencies petitioner’s
interpretation would produce.’’105
As we have seen, the ‘‘inconsistencies’’ in United’s interpretation
are far from obvious. The Court, it seems, sided with Timbers without
strong reasons for doing so. Why did the Court side with Timbers?
Perhaps it cared little about the outcome and effectively flipped a coin.
Perhaps it was reluctant to deviate from pre-Code practice. Perhaps it
found persuasive the same policy that guided the Fifth Circuit: all
creditors should ‘‘share the hurt’’ of a reorganization and a rule allowing
101.

Id. at 374.

102.

Id. at 375.

103. A similar point is made by Charles Jordan Tabb and Robert M. Lawless, Of
Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist
Court, 42 Syracuse L. Rev. 823, 837 n. 70 (1991).
104.

Timbers, 484 U.S. at 365.

105.

Id.
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interest payments would minimize the ‘‘hurt’’ borne by secured creditors. This policy, as we have seen, is dubious. Why should secured
creditors ‘‘share the hurt’’ in a process that offers them little or no
benefit?
The Court’s statutory analysis may be shaky, and its holding may be
at odds with economic theory, yet the final outcome in Timbers—denying
United’s request for adequate protection—may have much to commend
it. United’s lift-stay motion, recall, was an aggressive effort to cut short
the bankruptcy case. Although it was already compensated for most of
its lost investment opportunities, the bank argued for additional compensation that far exceeded its lost opportunities and far outstripped Timbers’ ability to pay. United, in other words, tried to cut short the
bankruptcy process without having to prove that ‘‘cause’’ existed for
lifting the stay under §362(d)(1). An important lesson of Timbers, then,
is that the phrase ‘‘adequate protection’’ is not so malleable that it can
support strategic opt-out behavior by secured creditors.
VII.

Case impact: holdings and dicta

Timbers’ legacy is mixed. Its holding has been limited by statute and
is easy to circumvent in practice. More than fifteen years after the
decision was handed down, it seems that only Justice Scalia’s dictum—
that relief from the stay should be granted unless there is a ‘‘reasonable
possibility of a successful reorganization within a reasonable time’’—may
have had a lasting effect.
In 1994, about seven years after the Court’s decision, Congress
responded with §362(d)(3).106 The new section was a partial rejection of
the Court’s holding, and a partial vindication of its dictum. In ‘‘single
asset real estate’’ cases that have lasted for more than 90 days, the
section declared, a court ‘‘shall’’ offer relief from the automatic stay
unless ‘‘(A) the debtor has filed a plan of reorganization that has a
reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time’’ or
‘‘(B) the debtor has commenced monthly payments to [the secured
creditor] TTT in an amount equal to interest at a current fair market rate
on the value of the creditor’s interest in the real estate.’’107 We see, then,
a vindication of the court’s dictum in (A) and a partial rejection of its
holding in (B). At least in single asset real estate cases, adequate
protection includes compensating the secured creditor for lost opportunity costs. About a decade later, in 2005, Congress muddied the waters by
amending (B) to require monthly payments at the ‘‘applicable nondefault
106. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified
in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. (2000)). Efforts to enact 362(d)(3) go back at least to
1991. See, e.g., H.R.2867, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §2 (1991).
107.

11 U.S.C. §362(d)(3) (1994) (amended 2005).
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contract rate of interest,’’108 which may differ from the fair market rate
but is simpler to compute (and so less subject to litigation).109 These
monthly payments, the 2005 amendments make explicit, can be made
from the rents generated by the real estate (as they were in Timbers).110
But what is a ‘‘single asset real estate’’ case? Until 2005, it was a
relatively small enterprise. As enacted in 1994, §101(51B) defined it as a
‘‘single property or project TTT which generates substantially all of the
gross income of a debtor and on which no substantial business is being
conducted other than the business of operating the real property.’’ So
far, so good: this definition encompassed Timbers and most other real
estate bankruptcies. But then came the kicker. Section 101(51B) concluded with a final qualification: a ‘‘single asset real estate’’ case was one
in which the value of the secured debt did not exceed $4 million. $4
million? That’s pocket change in most real estate bankruptcies. Even
Timbers would not have qualified as a ‘‘single asset real estate case.’’ To
make matters worse, the $4 million threshold wasn’t even indexed for
inflation; if it had been, the threshold would have risen to $5.3 million in
2005 (still a not very large number for most real estate cases). The
threshold was finally abandoned in the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.111 Now just about every case involving a single piece of real
estate will fall within the scope of §362(d)(3). It took Congress, then,
over fifteen years to overturn Timbers in the context of real estate cases.
Outside those cases, the holding is still good law.
Nonetheless, the holding is unimportant for many lenders. It has
always been easy to avoid much of its impact. The simplest strategy is to
take a security interest in a broad range of property (via a ‘‘blanket
lien’’) and thereby reduce the likelihood of becoming an undersecured
creditor subject to the rule in Timbers. For mortgagees, another strategy
is to take a security interest in any rents generated by the mortgaged
real estate.112 As we have already seen, rentals include compensation for
108. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
109–8, sec. 444, §362(d)(3)(B)(ii), 119 Stat. 23 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(3)(B)(ii)).
109. See, e.g., Richard Levin and Alesia Ranney–Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of
Chapter 11: The Significant Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 Am. Bankr. L. J. 603, 641–42 (2005).
110. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
109–8, sec. 444, §362(d)(3)(B)(i), 119 Stat. 23 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(3)(B)(i)).
111. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
109–8, sec. 1201(5), §362(d)(3)(B)(i), 119 Stat. 23, (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§362(d)(3)(B)(i)).
112. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 99, at 184 n. 5 (‘‘The opinion in Timbers TTT invites
secured creditors to include contractual ‘wrap-around’ clauses providing for a perfected
security interest in post-petition rental value of the collateral. By transforming lost
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the time value of money. Still another strategy is for a secured creditor
to enter a subordination agreement with junior creditors (secured or
unsecured), obligating them to divert any bankruptcy distributions to
the secured creditor until it has been paid in full, including post-petition
interest.113
Even when the decision in Timbers is hard to avoid, it may be
unimportant. Consider the case of lenders with security interests in
property other than real estate. When collateral takes the form of
personal property, such as trucks and machines, physical depreciation is
far more important than the interest foregone when the creditor is
unable to force an immediate sale of the collateral. A year of depreciation
typically dwarfs the foregone interest. This is especially true when
interest rates are relatively low, as they have been since the days of
Timbers.114 For these lenders, then, the holding in Timbers may be a
non-event.
To be sure, not all lenders can avoid Timbers’ bite. This may become
increasingly true with the advent of ‘‘second-lien financing.’’ A lender
takes a ‘‘second lien’’ when it extends financing to a highly leveraged
debtor and agrees that, in the event of default or bankruptcy, it will
receive payment after existing (‘‘first lien’’) secured lenders are paid in
full but before unsecured creditors receive anything.115 Until recently,
most second liens have been ‘‘silent’’ liens: the second-lien lenders
agreed not to foreclose on collateral outside bankruptcy, to contest
motions filed by first-lien lenders in bankruptcy (e.g., to lift the automatic stay or extend post-petition financing), or assert other rights—at least
opportunity into explicit economic rents, the secured creditor may be able to escape the
Timbers rule.’’).
113. Subordination agreements, especially as applied to post-petition interest, must
be drafted carefully to avoid ambiguity, as illustrated by In re Bank of New England Corp.,
364 F.3d 355 (1st Cir. 2004). There the subordination agreement provided that, in the
event of various contingencies including bankruptcy, the senior lender would receive full
payment of principal as well as ‘‘interest due or to become due’’ before the junior lender
received any payment. The First Circuit found it unclear whether this agreement covered
post-petition interest. When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, no interest ‘‘become[s]
due’’ because the Bankruptcy Code suspends accrual of interest during the pendency of the
case. On the other hand, the phrase ‘‘due or to become due’’ could include unmatured
interest, notwithstanding the rules of the Bankruptcy Code. Faced with ambiguity, the
court remanded for further factfinding.
114. The Federal Funds rate, for example, was over 9% in 1989 but has averaged
about 4% since then. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statistical
Release H.15, Selected Interest Rates, Historical Data (visited Sept. 1, 2006) ¢http://www.
federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm$.
115. For the mechanics of second-lien financing, see David Line Batty and Jo Ann J.
Brighton, ‘‘Silent’’ Second Liens—Will Bankruptcy Courts Keep the Peace?, 9 N.C. Banking
Inst. 1 (2005).
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for a limited period—until first-lien lenders were paid in full.116 A firstlien lender will not permit the debtor to take on second-lien financing
without these and other covenants. Second-lien lending is attractive,
despite these limitations, because the lender demands a relatively high
interest rate and obtains (limited) negotiating leverage and payment
priority that unsecured creditors do not enjoy.117 Because second-lien
lenders stand behind senior secured creditors, they are often highly
under-secured and thus exposed to Timbers’ holding, which may be a
serious handicap in a lengthy, protracted bankruptcy.
Then again, recall that Timbers matters most when interest rates
are high and cases drag on for years, during which time the undersecured creditor is uncompensated for the time-value of money. Since the
1980s, however, interest rates have fallen significantly. The prime rate—
the rate charged by banks on short-term business loans—averaged 12
percent during the 1980s, fell to about 8 percent during the 1990s, and
was only about 6 percent between 2000 and 2005.118 Interest rates, then,
have fallen by about 50% during the past 25 years, greatly reducing the
cost of delay in a lengthy case.
And lengthy cases have become a rarity. Among large,119 publiclytraded corporations, the median Chapter 11 case took about 31 months
during the period 1980–87.120 As Figure 1 illustrates, that figure fell to
about 15 months—a 53% drop—during the eight years (1989–96) following the Court’s decision in Timbers. During the 1997–2001 period,
median case length fell even further, to about 13 months, another 15%
reduction.
To be sure, some of this decline is surely due to the ‘‘prepackaged’’
and ‘‘prenegotiated’’ plans, which became popular during the 1990s.
Prepackaged plans are hammered out by a debtor and its dominant
116. Id. at 6–15. See also Steven S. Kerr and Joanna Rovito, Second-Lien Evolution
Creates Higher Recovery Prospects—At First–Lien Lenders’ Expense, in STANDARD & POOR’S
RATINGS SERVICES, A GUIDE TO THE LOAN MARKET 46–50 (Sept. 2005) (showing that, since 2004,
second-lien lenders have become much less ‘‘silent’’ and acquired greater control over
borrower collateral and greater negotiating leverage in the event of default or bankruptcy).
117. A second-lien lender, for example, has the right to be heard on the use of
collateral and, depending on the terms of the loan agreement, to object to post-petition
financing that will prime existing liens. See Batty and Brighton, supra note 136, at 15–16.
118. Prime rate data are taken from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve,
supra note 114.
119. A ‘‘large’’ corporation is defined as one with assets worth at least $500 million
(in 1980 dollars) at the time of filing.
120. The statistics reported here and in Figure 1 are computed using Lynn LoPucki,
Bankruptcy Research Database (visited Sept. 1, 2006) ¢http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/
bankruptcy research.asp$. Medians reported in the text are weighted averages of the
annual medians for the relevant periods.
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creditors prior to a bankruptcy petition. A bankruptcy petition is filed
only to bind dissenting, minority creditors. Immediately after filing, the
debtor will typically submit its plan, which will generally be confirmed
within a few weeks. Prenegotiated cases are similar, except that the
debtor has lined up support from some but not all of the dominant
creditors prior to the bankruptcy filing. A prenegotiated case may take
longer to conclude than a prepackaged one. In both types of cases,
however, the Timbers dicta loses much, if not all, of its force. For
prepacks, an effective reorganization is ‘‘in prospect’’ on the very first
day of the case. For prenegotiated cases, a plan will soon be formed.
Thus, if we want to assess the impact of Timbers on case duration, it
makes sense to exclude both types of cases from the calculation. (Indeed,
it might make sense to study these cases separately; to the extent that
Timbers reduced case duration and, therefore, made Chapter 11 cases
less costly, it may have reduced the attractiveness of prepacks and
prenegotiated cases.)

If we exclude these cases from the analysis, we see that case
duration fell somewhat less dramatically—by 41% (from 31 to 18
months), not 53%—during the eight years following Timbers.121 It fell
another 4% during the 1997–2001 period.
121.

Id.
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Most Chapter 11 cases don’t involve such large corporations. Among
businesses generally (about 90% of which are small firms with fewer
than 200 employees),122 we see similar patterns, as Figure 2 illustrates.
The data, however, are surprisingly hard to find, especially for the
1980s.123 Among cases with confirmed plans of reorganization, the median case time fell from 20 months in 1989 to 14 in 1999, a nearly 30%
decline. We see a similar reduction among the slowest cases: in 1989, 80
percent of cases reached confirmation within 37 months; by 1999, 80
percent of cases reached confirmation in less than 25 months—a drop of
about 32%. These statistics deal only with the minority of cases that end
in confirmation. Most small business cases end in dismissal or conversion. Among these, similar patterns are evident. Median time to conversion and dismissal fell 25% and 35%, respectively, over the 1989–99
period (from 11.5 to 8.6 months for conversions; from 12.3 to 8.0 months
for dismissals).124

These statistics are based on national surveys conducted by the
federal government. Several academic scholars have analyzed small
122. United States Census Bureau, Statistics of U.S. Business, ‘‘1988–2004 U.S. and
states, totals,’’ (visited Jan. 8, 2007) ¢http://www.census.gov./csd/susb/Totals88–04.xls$.
123. Statistics in this paragraph are drawn from Gordon Bermant and Ed Flynn,
Outcomes of Chapter 11 Cases: U.S. Trustee Database Sheds New Light on Old Questions,
ABI J. (Feb. 1998) (for the year 1989), and from Ed Flynn, United States Trustee Program:
Report on Chapter 11 Cases, 1990–2001 (unpublished manuscript) (for years 1990–99).
124. Interestingly, total Chapter 11 filings declined (see Figure 2) during the same
period that filings by large corporations were rising (see Figure 1) and filings by consumers
were skyrocketing. This pattern remains something of a mystery, but may be explained by
the increasing popularity of state-law alternatives to the Bankruptcy Code, including
assignments for the benefit of creditors. See Edward R. Morrison, Bargaining Around
Bankruptcy: Small Busines Distress and State Law (Jan. 2007) (working paper).
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business cases in select jurisdictions. LoPucki, for example, studied
Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings in the Western District of Missouri during
the period 1979–80, the first year after the Bankruptcy Code went into
effect. His data show that the median case lasted at least 7 months.125
More recently, Morrison studied Chapter 11 filings in the Northern
District of Illinois during calendar year 1998. The median case length in
his study was shorter—about 5.7 months.126 This difference may seem
small in absolute numbers (1.7 months), but it is fairly large in proportionate terms (19%). Thus, both national surveys and close studies of
particular jurisdictions show a decline in case duration over the past few
decades.
It is tempting to attribute these declines in case duration to Timbers. The Supreme Court, in so many words, encouraged judges to put
debtors on tighter leashes: a lift-stay motion should be granted, the
Court said, unless a successful reorganization is clearly on the horizon.
And, over the past 15 years, we have seen a significant decline in case
duration, both in large and small business cases. Indeed, the Court’s
dictum may have had an impact on Timbers itself: two days after the
Court’s decision, United Savings filed a lift-stay motion in the bankruptcy court, citing the debtor’s lack of a ‘‘realistic prospect of reorganization,’’ language quite similar to the Court’s dictum. This motion was
granted on February 20, 1988. The bank subsequently sold the apartment, on May 3, to a third party (for how much, we do not know).
But a healthy dose of skepticism should be brought to bear here.
There are important difficulties in attributing real-world effects to
Timbers. Correlation does not imply causation. The Timbers dictum may
have been uttered when case length was already declining. Indeed, the
past twenty years have seen significant change in the bankruptcy process. Creditors have gained greater control over the bankruptcy process;
judges have become more sophisticated and less willing to allow failing
firms to linger in bankruptcy. Timbers may have contributed to this
development—it certainly did not retard it—but it is difficult to say
whether its contribution was significant.
Indeed, it is not obvious that Timbers should have caused case
length to fall. Roughly speaking, the Court encouraged bankruptcy
judges to speed up their cases and, in the process, reduce the costs of
bankruptcy to creditors. A lower-cost bankruptcy process reduces incen125. The phrase ‘‘at least’’ is used here because several cases were still pending when
LoPucki’s study went to press. Among cases ending in plan confirmation, median case
length was at least 10 months; among cases ending in dismissal or conversion to Chapter 7,
it was at least 5.5 months.
126. Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Continuation Bias in Small Business Bankruptcies, J. L. & Econ. (forthcoming 2007).
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tives for debtors and their creditors to resolve financial distress outside
bankruptcy. As more firms enter the bankruptcy system, average case
duration could rise, fall, or go unchanged. It could rise if the cases
entering the system—the ‘‘marginal cases’’—are more complex and timeconsuming than the cases that would have entered the system regardless
of the dictum in Timbers. It could fall if the marginal cases are no more
complex than the average case. The data show case length falling over
time, but this could reflect factors other than the Timbers decision.
This is a problem common to all empirical legal scholarship: any
court decision will cast a ‘‘shadow’’ over disputes that are, ordinarily,
resolved or settled outside the legal system. This shadow will affect the
parties’ incentives to settle and alter the composition of cases in the
courts. We cannot assume that a change in legal rules will only impact
the kinds of cases we actually see. For every case in court, there are
thousands of disputes settled outside of court, most of which are impossible to study systematically.
Moreover, if the dictum had any effect, it should have been a onetime reduction in case duration. That is, once judges took the dictum to
heart, case duration should have fallen to a new, lower average. We
should see case duration fall, but we should not see it fall continuously
over time. We in fact see just the opposite: case duration has fallen
continuously over time. Among cases involving large corporations, duration fell 28% between 1989 and 1996 and fell another 17% between 1997
and 2001. Timbers may have contributed to the decline, but it is not the
only story. Much more is going on.
The most we can say, then, is that the past twenty years have seen
constantly declining durations in Chapter 11 cases and that Timbers may
have contributed to this important phenomenon. Chapter 11 is getting
cheaper. Failing firms do not linger under the protection of the court;
judges are increasingly willing to terminate the Chapter 11 process when
a firm’s prospects are bleak. As a result, it is rare to see long-lived cases
in which professional fees escalate and creditors see their returns decay.
Timbers was originally seen as a decision contributing to the inefficiency
of the Chapter 11 process, because it forced secured creditors to bear
some of the costs of the reorganization process. The decision seems not
to have had that effect at all: if anything, it has contributed to the speed
of the modern Chapter 11 process.
VIII.

Conclusion

Timbers tells us several stories. One is the economics of rent. For
United Savings, the stakes in Timbers were smaller than they might
seem. When it requested compensation for lost investment opportunities,
Timbers was already turning over all (net) rentals generated by the
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apartment complex. And those rentals included compensation for lost
opportunities, discounted by expected capital gains. One view of United’s
motion, then, is that it was an effort to avoid this discount. Another view
is that United was gambling for more—it had nothing to lose and could
benefit from judicial error in its favor. And it seems the court did indeed
err in computing the payments necessary to compensate United. Seen
this way, the Supreme Court’s decision makes sense: it corrected an
error.
But the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari merely to correct a
factual error. It most likely did not even realize that such a mistake had
occurred. It reviewed Timbers to decide whether, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the phrase ‘‘adequate protection’’ encompasses compensation for lost investment opportunities. The Court’s decision, as we
have seen, is far from satisfying. The phrase is ambiguous and the rest of
the Code offers little clarification. Nonetheless, the Court rejected what
may be the most intuitive interpretation—that ‘‘adequate protection’’
means compensating a secured creditor for all interests harmed by the
automatic stay, including its interest in immediate foreclosure.
Here too, however, the stakes are much smaller than they appear.
Congress has overruled Timbers in the context of single-asset real estate
cases. Lenders have identified various strategies to limit their exposure
to Timbers. And Chapter 11 cases have become much shorter, limiting
the cost any secured lender will suffer from delay. This is the second
story of Timbers: its interpretation of the Code has been largely neutralized by Congress, markets, and the bankruptcy process.

